

Database Applications of Role-Based Access Control

**Sylvia Osborn
The University of Western Ontario
Nov. 12, 2001**

Nov. 12, 2001

1

Outline of Talk

- **Brief Introduction to Access Control Models**
- **Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)**
- **Database Applications of RBAC**

Nov. 12, 2001

2

Basic Definitions

Subject: an entity wishing to access an object

Object: the entity on which operations take place or on which the subject acts

Access Mode: one of the legal operations that can be performed by a subject on an object

Nov. 12, 2001

3

Discretionary Access Control

- The owner of an object can give permissions to others at his/her discretion
- Typical of operating systems and relational databases
- Basic model here is the access matrix

Nov. 12, 2001

4

Example of Access Matrix

Subjects	Objects				
	O_1	...	O_j	...	O_m
S_1	$A[s_1, o_1]$		$A[s_1, o_j]$		$A[s_1, o_m]$
.					
.					
S_i	$A[s_i, o_1]$		$A[s_i, o_j]$		$A[s_i, o_m]$
.					
.					
S_n	$A[s_n, o_1]$		$A[s_n, o_j]$		$A[s_n, o_m]$

Nov. 12, 2001

5

Storage of Access Control Information

- The Access Control matrix is typically sparse
- Stored by rows: called a *capability list*
- Stored by columns: called an *access control list*

Nov. 12, 2001

6

Administration of access control

- As well as having a right, one can have the right to grant it to others
- In discretionary models, this is given to owners of the object
- In some versions of the access matrix model, the grant permission is shown by +

Nov. 12, 2001

7

Example from db2

```
db2 => connect to canada
Database Connection Information
Database product      = DB2/6000 1.1.0
SQL authorization ID = LJR
Local database alias = CANADA

db2 => select * from sysibm.sysstatbauth where tcreator <> 'SYSIBM'
```

GRANTOR	GRANTEE	TREATOR	TTRNAME	TABAUTH	CONTROLAUTH	ALTERAUTH	DELETEAUTH	INDEXAUTH	INSERTAUTH	SELECTAUTH	UPDATEAUTH	REFAUTH
SYSIBM	LJR	LJR	PROVINCES	255	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SYSIBM	LJR	LJR	PROVINCS	255	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SYSIBM	LJR	LJR	MUSIC	255	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
LJR	MELCH	LJR	PROVINCS	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	QAM	LJR	PROVINCS	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	DSTONES	LJR	PROVINCS	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	TOBHN	LJR	PROVINCS	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	WARREN	LJR	PROVINCS	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	ACTE	LJR	PROVINCS	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	WATPE	LJR	PROVINCS	4	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
LJR	YAMMS	LJR	PROVINCS	4	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
LJR	SILZGA	LJR	PROVINCS	4	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
LJR	HANFH	LJR	PROVINCS	52	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N
LJR	MGCE	LJR	PROVINCS	52	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N
LJR	WHIDE	LJR	PROVINCS	52	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N
LJR	QURTS	LJR	PROVINCS	52	N	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	N	N
LJR	MELCH	LJR	PROVINCS	36	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
LJR	QAM	LJR	PROVINCS	36	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
LJR	DSTONES	LJR	PROVINCS	36	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
LJR	TOBHN	LJR	PROVINCS	36	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
LJR	BAUER	LJR	MUSIC	32	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N
LJR	SHAWA	LJR	MUSIC	36	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N	N
LJR	PEPV	LJR	MUSIC	96	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
LJR	ROBBINS	LJR	MUSIC	72	N	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N
LJR	BRATCHB	LJR	MUSIC	64	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	BRUCE	LJR	MUSIC	104	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N	N

26 records selected.

Nov. 12, 2001

8


Mandatory access control

- Subjects have labels called their *clearance*
- Objects have labels called their *classification*
- Labels are arranged in a lattice
- Access is decided by comparing the two security labels using certain rules (no read up, no write down, etc.)

Nov. 12, 2001

9

RBAC – 3 planes



Nov. 12, 2001

10


Some definitions

- **Role:** named collection of privileges
- **Privilege:** (object, operand) pair
- **Group:** set of users
- **Direct privileges:** not available to immediate juniors
- **Effective privileges:** direct and all inherited privileges

Nov. 12, 2001

11

Example Role Graph



For VP1,
Direct privileges are
{9,10}
Effective are
{1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9,10}

Nov. 12, 2001

12

Algorithms


Insert a role - 2 algorithms:

1. Insert1(role name, direct privs, juniors, seniors)
2. Insert2(role name, effective privs)

Nov. 12, 2001

13

Example of Insert1




Insert1

- Role name: M
- Direct: {6, 12}
- Juniors: {L1, L2}
- Seniors: {VP1}

Nov. 12, 2001

14


Result



Nov. 12, 2001

15

Example of Insert2




Insert2

- Role name: President
- Effective: {9,10,11}

Nov. 12, 2001

16

Result



Nov. 12, 2001

17

Other Algorithms

- Delete role
- Add/delete privileges to/from a role
- Add/delete edges

They all restore certain properties:


1. Acyclic (aborts if duplicate roles created)
2. path $r_i \boxtimes r_k$ if privs of $r_i \subset$ privs of r_k
3. MaxRole and MinRole are always present
4. Display transitive reduction, with MaxRole at top of page, MinRole at bottom, and inheritance of privileges going up the page.

- All the algorithms are polynomial in the size of the graph and the size of the privilege lists

Nov. 12, 2001

18

Sandhu's RBAC'96 model



Nov. 12, 2001

19

Relationship of DAC, MAC and RBAC

- RBAC can simulate MAC and DAC (Osborn, Sandhu and Munawer, ACM TISSEC, May 2000)
- The DAC simulation uses lots of administrative roles
- The MAC simulation assumes one administrative role, and is very simple

Nov. 12, 2001

20

Issues for Database Security

- **More granularity types**
- **Access to containers implies access to contents**
- **Also access to schema information**
- **Access to data implies can read schema**
- **More operations than simply read/write/execute**
- **Some notion of administrative roles whether or not there are roles for users: DBA, sysadmin, etc.**
- **Transactions**

Nov. 12, 2001

21

How RBAC fits with relational

- **Can look at the permission information and draw the role graph (next example)**
- **Role names have to be generated**
- **Also did a project which converted from a role graph to DB2 (had to turn off table ownership – control privilege)**

Nov. 12, 2001

22

That example from DB2

```
db2 => connect to canada
Database Connection Information
Database product      = DB2/6000 1.1.0
SQL authorization ID = LJR
Local database alias = CANADA
db2 => select * from sysibm.sysatabauth where tcreator <> 'SYSTEM'
```


GRANTOR	GRANTEE	TREATOR	TNAME	TABAUTH	CONTROLAUTH	ALTERAUTH	DELETEAUTH	INDEXAUTH	INSERTAUTH	SELECTAUTH	UPDATEAUTH	REFAUTH
SYSTEM	LJR	LJR	PROVINCES	295	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SYSTEM	LJR	LJR	ANIMALS	295	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
SYSTEM	LJR	LJR	MUSIC	295	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
LJR	WELCH	LJR	ANIMALS	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	QJM	LJR	ANIMALS	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	DSTOKES	LJR	ANIMALS	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	TOBAN	LJR	ANIMALS	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	WARREN	LJR	PROVINCES	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	PETE	LJR	PROVINCES	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	WHYME	LJR	PROVINCES	4	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
LJR	YHUANG	LJR	PROVINCES	4	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
LJR	SYLVIA	LJR	PROVINCES	4	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
LJR	HANAN	LJR	PROVINCES	82	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	MAGI	LJR	PROVINCES	82	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	JANICE	LJR	PROVINCES	82	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	CURTIS	LJR	PROVINCES	82	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	WELCH	LJR	PROVINCES	36	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	QJM	LJR	PROVINCES	36	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	DSTOKES	LJR	PROVINCES	36	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	TOBAN	LJR	PROVINCES	36	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	BAUER	LJR	MUSIC	32	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	SANDY	LJR	MUSIC	36	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	PERV	LJR	MUSIC	86	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	ROBBINS	LJR	MUSIC	72	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	N
LJR	KATCHAB	LJR	MUSIC	64	N	N	N	N	N	Y	N	N
LJR	BRUCE	LJR	MUSIC	104	N	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y	N

26 record(s) selected.

Nov. 12, 2001

23

Becomes this role graph



Role	Users	Effective Privileges
MinRole	LJR	Provinces: All, Animals: All, Music: All
Role 1	BRUCE	Music: Update, Select, Index
Role 2	HANAN, MAGI, JANICE, CURTIS	Provinces: Select, Delete, Insert
Role 3	CAM, WELCH, DSTOKES, TOBAN	Animals: Select
Role 4	SANDY	Music: Delete, Select
Role 5	PERV	Music: Update, Select
Role 6	ROBBINS	Music: Update, Index
Role 7	WARREN, PETE	Provinces: Select
Role 8	WHYME, YHUANG, SYLVIA	Provinces: Delete
Role 9	KATCHAB	Music: Update
Role 10	BAUER	Music: Select
MinRole	None	None

Nov. 12, 2001

24

Oracle's roles

- A permission can be assigned to a user or to a role
- Roles can be assigned to roles
- Thus can get role hierarchies, but
 - not obliged to have only roles
 - no role graph or algorithms

Nov. 12, 2001

25

Integrating Two Systems

- Users - which have names
- Roles - which have names
- Privileges - data and operator
 - integrated by database integration techniques

Nov. 12, 2001

26


Basic Algorithm

- **Insert one role graph into the other**
 - possibly with some intervention by Security Administrator
- **Users get mapped to roles they had before**
 - possibly with some intervention by Security Administrator

Nov. 12, 2001

27

Roles and Privileges Disjoint



Nov. 12, 2001


28

Privilege sets not disjoint, role names are, users may or may not be disjoint

- If a role from RG1 has equal privilege set to a role in RG2, merge the two roles in the result.
- Keep track of the mapping of the two roles to the merged role
- Map users in RG1 to same roles (or what they are mapped to)
- Do the same for RG2 - may need human intervention

Nov. 12, 2001

29



Nov. 12, 2001


30

Some duplicate role names, no duplicate privileges

- Needs human intervention
- Security admin can decide to rename one of them - back to first case
- Security admin can decide to keep the common role
 - rename two original roles - keep track of mapping to new role names
 - Insert new role with common name, and union of the privileges of the two original roles
 - The new role has no direct privileges

Nov. 12, 2001

31



Nov. 12, 2001


32

Duplicate role names, duplicate privileges

- Completely disjoint privileges -- previous case
- Completely duplicate privileges -- just merge and map one of the names
- some overlap of privileges -- create a common junior with the intersection of privileges

Nov. 12, 2001


33



Nov. 12, 2001

34


System 1, Oracle e.g.



Nov. 12, 2001

35


System 2, automatically generated



Nov. 12, 2001

36


Merging Role Graphs



Nov. 12, 2001

37


Merged Graph



Nov. 12, 2001

38


Two Mandatory Systems



Liberal *-Property

Nov. 12, 2001


39



Strict *-Property

Nov. 12, 2001

40



Conclusions

- **RBAC is a more natural, flexible way of expressing access control than traditional methods**
- **Managing a complex role hierarchy can be efficient**
- **Roles are available in relational packages**
- **Merging of role graphs can provide a general way to integrate security information**

References

- Sylvia@csd.uwo.ca
- NIST: <http://csrc.nist.gov/rbac/>
- Ravi Sandhu's web page(draft NIST standard is there):
<http://ite.gmu.edu/list/sandhu/>
- S. Osborn, R. Sandhu and Q. Munawer. Configuring Role-Based Access Control to Enforce Mandatory and Discretionary Access Control Policies.ACM TISSEC, vol.3, no. 2, (2000) 85-106.
- M. Nyanhama and S. Osborn,The Role Graph Model and Conflict of Interest, ACM TISSEC, vol.2, no. 1, (1999) 3-33.
- S. Osborn. Database Security Integration using Role-Based Access Control. in Data and Applications Security Developments and Directions, Thuraisingham, van de Riet, Dittrich and Tari, editors. Kluwer, 2001. 245-257.
- S. Osborn, L.K. Reid and G.J. Wesson. On the Interaction Between Role-Based Access Control and Relational Databases,Proceeding of the IFIP WG11.3 Tenth Annual Working Conference on Database Security,Chapman & Hall, Samarati and Sandhu eds., July, 1996, 275--287.